Reentrant processing has been proposed as a critical mechanism in visual perception of an object's features. In order to test whether reentry is critical for visual awareness of object presence, the success of reentry was manipulated with object substitution masking (OSM) while participants performed a forced-choice target present-absent task and rated their subjective confidence in each trial. Signal detection analyses were performed on the data from the forced-choice task and on the subjective confidence ratings. The results showed that OSM reduced sensitivity to the presence of the target, indicating that reentry is critical for awareness of object presence. Consistent with the idea that OSM leaves feedforward processing intact, confidence ratings in reported target-absent trials were lower for misses (target present, no response) than for correct rejections (target absent, no response), implying that a target-related sensory signal was available for subjective ratings in spite of reported absence of the target. The results suggest that reentry is critical for encoding the target representation into a stable, consciously reportable form.
Introduction
Recent theories of visual awareness agree that a mere feedforward flow of information from the primary visual cortex (V1) to higher visual areas is not sufficient for full-blown, vivid conscious perception. They concur that reentrant (recurrent or feedback) signals from higher areas back to the early visual cortex play an important role in conscious vision (Bullier, 2001; Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) . At a more specific level, the roles of feedforward and reentrant processing in conscious visual perception are not clear. According to the reversed hierarchy theory (RHT) (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002) , conscious perception begins when feedforward processing reaches high cortical levels, resulting in the first approximation ''guess'' (vision at a glance) as to the binding of features falling within the large receptive fields of high cortical areas. After vision at glance, conscious perception proceeds in a reentrant manner to encompass detailed information available at the small receptive fields of earlier cortical areas (vision with scrutiny). On the other hand, Lamme (2006) has argued for a more tight connection between reentrant processing and visual awareness by proposing that recurrent (reentrant) processes are necessary for visual awareness, so that the presence of recurrent processing in the brain can be considered as a neural marker of awareness.
Object substitution masking (OSM) (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997 ) provides a psychophysical method for studying the contribution of reentry on visual awareness as it is generally assumed to interfere with visual processing at the stage of reentry (for an alternative view, see Francis & Hermens, 2002 ; see also the response from Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2002) . OSM occurs when a target and a mask (e.g., four dots surrounding the target) appear simultaneously but the mask persists after the offset of the target. The delayed offset of the mask impairs target identification as compared with a situation in which the target and mask offset simultaneously. The object substitution theory (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000) explains this effect by assuming that the representation of the target is substituted by that of the mask during reentrant processing. In the beginning of processing, the stimulus display is encoded at a low level and feedforward activation proceeds to higher levels in which tentative representations are formed. These representations may be incomplete or more than one representation may be activated. The ambiguity can be resolved on the second and later iterations by comparing the high level representations with the initial pattern of activity at the lower level. A match is found and processing continues if the stimulus display has not been changed or if it has been turned off and there is nothing competing with the decaying initial representation. However, if the reentrant information does not match the information present at the lower level, a new tentative representation emerges. Thus, in OSM, the initial representation (target + mask) is replaced with that of the trailing mask which alone is present at the time of reentry. As a consequence, the observer perceives only the mask. However, if atten-tion is precued to the location where the target is going to appear, the object substitution masking effect is greatly reduced because fewer reentrant iterations are needed (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns, 2004; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997; Germeys et al., 2010) . Recent behavioral (Bouvier & Treisman, 2010; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2011) and neural (Boehler et al., 2008; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2012; Kotsoni et al., 2007) studies have confirmed that OSM takes place at late stage of processing which most probably corresponds to reentrant processing occurring after basic features have been extracted in feedforward manner. Thus, OSM provides a behavioral method for manipulating reentrant processing.
Previous studies have shown that OSM reduces conscious identification of the features of targets, such as the shape (Enns, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2003) , color (Gellatly et al., 2007) , orientation (Boehler et al., 2008; Gellatly et al., 2007) , semantic meaning (Reiss & Hoffman, 2006) , or conjunctions of features (Bouvier & Treisman, 2010; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2011) . These results imply that reentrant processes are involved in recognition of specific features of objects. However, it is less clear whether the reentrant processes are critical for visual awareness of objects (i.e., of object presence). In two recent studies on OSM (Chen & Treisman, 2009; Goodhew et al., 2011) , the participants performed a speeded discrimination task regarding the mask and then a detection (present/absent) task concerning the target in each trial. Both studies found that in those of the target-present trials in which the participants reported that no target was presented, the information suppressed via OSM nevertheless influenced performance in the mask discrimination tasks. This pattern seems to suggest that conscious detection of target presence specifically was influenced by OSM. However, these studies did not make any attempt to study whether the impairments in detection reflected a genuine inability to discriminate between the presence and absence of the target or whether the masking effects were due to a conservative bias to report absence of the target rather than its presence when unsure. It remains also unclear whether the order of the tasks (the target detection tasks were performed after the mask discrimination tasks) influenced the masking effects in the target detection task.
The implications of neuroscientific studies for the necessity of reentry in visual awareness are unclear. For example, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of early visual cortex (V1/V2) at late latencies (which presumably correspond to the timing of reentrant processing) has been shown to interfere with perception of motion (Koivisto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2010; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Silvanto, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005) , binding of feature conjunctions (Juan & Walsh, 2003; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2012) , recognition of natural images (Camprodon et al., 2010; and figure-ground segmentation (Heinen, Jolij, & Lamme, 2005) , but it is not clear whether TMS over early visual areas during reentrant processing would prevent object representation from entering to visual awareness. Thus, although the results of TMS studies are often considered as strong causal evidence for the necessity of reentrant processing in visual awareness, none of the TMS studies have focused on the role of reentry in awareness of object's presence.
The present study tested the role of reentry in visual awareness by examining with the aid of signal detection analysis whether conscious detection of target's presence is affected or not when reentrant processing is interfered by OSM. The participants gave a forced-choice target present-absent response after each trial. This resulted in four types of trials: hits (target present, yes response), misses (target present, no response), correct rejections (target absent, no response), and false alarms (target absent, yes response). By applying standard signal detection analysis (see e.g., Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) on the data, it was possible to analyze sensitivity to the presence of the target independent of the decision criteria (i.e., liberal or conservative bias) that the participants adopted for reporting target presence. In addition to the ''objective'' forcedchoice target present-absent task, the participants rated their subjective confidence after each trial. As unawareness of a stimulus may result from different causes, the confidence ratings were expected to shed light on the nature of the potential unawareness produced by OSM. If the stimulus signal is degraded to the extent that it is indistinguishable from any signal at all, the unawareness represents perceptual blindness (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) . Thus, suppression of low-level signals leads to perceptual awareness and the observer cannot subjectively distinguish between the presence and absence of a stimulus. On the other hand, even a strong stimulus may remain out of awareness because the observer is not attending to it, for example, during inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998) . In this case, the unawareness is attentional blindness in which observers fail to notice the presence of a stimulus due to failure to access low-level signals in spite of their presence (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) . In order to assess whether the potential unawareness induced by OSM represents perceptual blindness or attentional blindness, the second-level signal detection analysis compared the subjective confidence levels between miss trials (target present, no response) and correct rejections (target not present, no response). Such analysis reveals whether or not the presence or absence of the target can be subjectively discriminated in spite of the reported absence of the target in the forced-choice judgements (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) . Equal confidence levels between misses and correct rejections would indicate perceptual blindness in which subjective invisibility is caused by suppression of low-level sensory signals; lower confidence in misses than in correct rejections would implicate attentional blindness in which observers fail to notice the presence of a target due to failure to access low-level signals despite their presence (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) . A backward pattern masking condition with a short targetmask onset-asynchrony (SOA) was included to validate the procedure and for comparing the results of OSM to a form of masking that is expected to induce perceptual blindness by integration masking (Turvey, 1973) during feedforward processing (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Enns, 2004) . In short, the main question was whether or not late stages of visual processing, as manipulated with OSM, are critical for visual awareness of object presence.
Methods

Participants
Sixteen graduate or undergraduate students (5 males, mean age 26.7 years, SD = 8.2) from the University of Turku volunteered. They all had normal or corrected-to normal vision. The experiment was carried out in accordance with The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki).
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were presented on a 17 00 CRT-monitor with 75 Hz screen refresh rate. Each stimulus display consisted of eight stimulus dots (0.4°Â 0.4°squares) in target present trials and seven stimulus dots in target-absent trial (Fig. 1) . The stimulus dots appeared in eight possible positions and were arranged in a circular pattern, centered 3.7°from fixation. One of the positions was surrounded by four additional dots, each centered 0.8°away from the center of the position. In target-present trials, the position surrounded by the four dots was occupied by a stimulus dot (i.e., the target); in the target-absent trials the position was empty. Thus, the stimulus displays were constructed so that the target (a dot) and the elements of the OSM mask (four dots) were perceptually identical (Gellatly et al., 2007) and in simultaneous presentation they could be perceived as a single object in a such way (symbol ''five'' in dice) that during delayed mask offset the representation needed updating at the object level (Moore & Lleras, 2005 ) (i.e., from ''five'' to ''four''). The backward mask was the # symbol (0.7°Â 0.7°). The fixation point, dots, and mask were white and the background was black.
Each participant performed the object substitution condition (OSM) and the backward masking condition in separate blocks, with the order of the conditions counterbalanced across participants. Within both conditions, half of the trials were masked. Half of the no mask and masked trials were cued.
Each uncued trial began with the fixation point for 600 ms, followed by the stimulus display for 27 ms. In the no mask trials, the display was followed by a blank screen until the end of the trial. In the masked OSM trials the four dots, which surrounded the target position, remained on the screen for 300 ms after the offset of the stimulus display (= trailing mask or delayed offset mask). In the backward mask trials, the offset of the stimulus display was followed by the backward mask in the target position for 300 ms. The cued trials were otherwise identical to the uncued ones, but the four dots appeared in the target position 100 ms earlier than the stimulus display was turned on. There were an equal number of target-present and target-absent trials in each condition.
After each trial, the participant made a forced-choice yes-no discrimination response concerning whether or not a target was presented in the position that was surrounded by the four dots. After each forced-choice response, the participant rated the confidence of his/her response on a three-point scale (1 = low, 2 = intermediate, 3 = high).
The order of no mask and mask trials, cued and uncued trials, and the target location was randomized. For each participant, there were a total of 512 trials, with 32 trials in each cell (e.g., 32 stimulus-present, masked, cued trials in the OSM condition).
Data analyses
Sensitivity to the presence of a target in the forced-choice task was quantified as the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC), which was constructed by plotting hit rate (''yes'' responses in target-present trials) against false alarm rate (''yes'' responses in target-absent trials). AUC is a nonparametric measure that is unaffected by response bias, with the value .50 indicating an inability to distinguish signals from noise and larger values indicating increasing ability to do so. Response bias was quantified as c. Values of c higher than 0 indicate a conservative criterion and values lower than 0 indicate a liberal criterion. In the calculation of c, hit and false alarm rates of 0 or 1 were dealt with adding 0.5 to both the number of hits and the number of false alarms and adding 1 to both the number of stimulus-present trials and the number of target-absent trials (Hautus, 1995) .
A second-level AUC was computed for trials in which the participants reported the absence of a target (misses and correct rejections) by plotting the rate of high-confidence correct rejection trials against high-confidence miss trials (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) . This AUC quantifies the ability to discriminate between correct rejections and misses.
Results
Sensitivity in the forced-choice target present-absent judgments
The effects of masking on sensitivity in the forced-choice target present-absent task was studied by a Condition (2: OSM vs. backward masking) Â Cueing (2: uncued vs. cued) Â Masking (2: no mask, mask) ANOVA on the first-level AUC (Fig. 2) . It revealed that all the main effects (Fs(1, 15) P 14.05, ps 6 0.002, g (F(1, 15) = 41.20, p < 0.001, g 2 p = .733). While the masking effect was highly significant without the cue (F(1, 15) = 36.28, p < 0.001, g 2 p = .708), no statistically significant effect of masking was observed in the cued condition (F < 1). Thus, OSM reduced sensitivity to the presence of the target, but cueing completely eliminated its effect.
In the backward masking condition, significant masking oc- shows that the overall level of performance was higher in the cued condition than in the uncued one, but the masking effect did not vary as a function of cueing (F < 1). The target present-absent discrimination performance was not statistically significantly different from the chance level in the uncued backward masking condition (t(15) = 1.74, p = 0.102), whereas in all other situations, including the OSM conditions, the observers performed at higher than the chance level in discriminating between target-present and target-absent trials (ts P 3.97, ps 6 0.001).
Response criterion (c)
For response criterion (c) (Fig. 3) , a Condition Â Cueing Â Masking interaction (F(1, 15) = 17.27, p = 0.001, g 2 p = .535) was observed. Separate analysis of the OSM condition showed that the response criterion was more conservative in masked than unmasked trials One-group t-tests comparing the c scores to 0 in the OSM condition showed a significant liberal criterion bias in the uncued no mask trials (t(15) = 4.07, p = 0.001) and a conservative bias in the uncued mask trials (t(15) = 2.23, p = 0.042). In other words, the observers were reluctant to report the presence of the target when they were unsure about it in uncued, masked OSM trials. In the backward masking condition, cueing and masking interacted (F(1, 15) = 10.55, p = 0.005, g 2 p = .413), indicating a liberal criterion bias in uncued masked condition (t(15) = 2.61, p = 0.020) and no bias in the other conditions.
Subjective confidence in target-absent responses
In masked trials, four participants did not miss any targets in the cued OSM condition, one did not make misses in the uncued backward masking condition due to a liberal response criterion, and one participant did not make any correct rejections in the uncued backward masking condition. Therefore the number of participants varies in the following analyses. Fig. 4 shows the frequency distribution of confidence ratings (scale: 1 = low, 2 = middle, 3 = high) for misses and correct rejections in the masked OSM and backward masking conditions. Fig. 5 plots the mean confidence ratings (on scale 1-3) of each individual in correct rejection trials against those in miss trials. The rates of high-confidence misses and correct rejections were used to compute the second-level AUC as a measure for the subjective discriminability of misses and correct rejections. A 2 (Condition) Â 2 (Cueing) ANOVA on the second-level AUC revealed a main effect for Condition, F(1, 9) = 7.94, p = 0.020, g 2 p = .469, indicating that the difference in confidence between correct rejection and miss trials was higher in OSM than in backward masking condition. Cueing increased the discriminability (F(1, 9) = 6.58, p = 0.030, g 2 p = .422) differently depending on the masking condition (Condition Â Cueing (F(1, 9) = 6.05, p = 0.036, g 2 p = .402). In the OSM condition cueing increased discriminability of misses and CRs (F(1, 11) = 5.96, p = 0.033, g 2 p = .351). The value of AUC was higher than expected by chance both in uncued (.53)(t(15) = 3.15, p = 0.007) and cued (.65) (t(11) = 2.95, p = .013) conditions, showing that the observers were subjectively able to discriminate between target-absent (correct rejection) and targets-present (miss) trials, irrespective of cueing.
In backward masking, the value of AUC did not differ from chance level in the uncued condition (.50) (t(13) = 1.20, p = 0.254), suggesting that the observers could not subjectively discriminate between target-present (miss) and target-absent (correct rejection) trials. In the cued condition, the value of AUC was higher than expected by chance (.51) (t(15) = 2.58, p = 0.021), but the difference between uncued and cued condition did not reach statistical significance (F(1, 13) = 2.81, p = 0.117, g 2 p = .178).
Discussion
The role of reentrant or recurrent processing in conscious perception was studied by making use of substitution masking (OSM) which is assumed to occur specifically at the stage of reentry. It is well known that OSM impairs perception and binding of visual features (Boehler et al., 2008; Bouvier & Treisman, 2010; Enns, 2004; Gellatly et al., 2007; Koivisto & Silvanto, 2011; Reiss & Hoffman, 2006; Woodman & Luck, 2003) . The major question here was whether or not OSM is able to wholly mask the presence of a target stimulus. The results from signal detection analysis revealed that OSM strongly reduced sensitivity to the presence of the target. This occurred when attention was not cued to the position of the target. When the target location was precued, the object substitution masking effect was completely eliminated Given that OSM reduced awareness of targets, it was reasonable to analyze the subjective confidence ratings when the target was missed. The confidence ratings for miss trials were lower than those for correct rejections, suggesting that when the participants were not aware of the target, they were nevertheless able to subjectively discriminate between target-present and target-absent trials. Thus, the invisibility produced by OSM was attentional blindness (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) in which the target-related sensory signal was present but the observers failed to access it. This is consistent with the idea that OSM leaves feedforward processing intact (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000) . By contrast, backward masking produced a different pattern of results, consistent with the expectation that it influences earlier stages of processing than OSM (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Enns, 2004) . Without precueing, backward masking completely eliminated the sensitivity to the presence of a target. In addition, subjective confidence ratings for misses and correct rejections were equal, indicating that the presence of targets was subjectively indistinguishable from their physical absence. These findings imply the invisibility induced by backward masking was perceptual blindness (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) in which the sensory signal was reduced and was not available even for confidence ratings. In general, backward masking by pattern produced stronger masking effects than masking by object substitution. No attempt was made to match the sensitivity (AUC) in the forced-choice task between OSM and backward masking. By increasing the SOA between the target and mask in the backward masking condition, sensitivity might have increased to the same level as in the OSM condition but the mechanism of backward masking would have changed from integration at feedforward stage to interruption (Turvey, 1973) which is supposed to occur at the stage of reentrant processing (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Enns, 2004) . In the present study, the important conclusion from the comparison between the masking types is, however, that the masking-induced unawareness is qualitatively different depending on whether feedforward or reentrant processing is influenced.
What is the conscious status of the signal that survived the attentional blindness induced by OSM? The account that reentrant processing is necessary for awareness (Lamme, 2006) would argue that the signal was unconscious. Recent studies have revealed that information suppressed via OSM can have an indirect influence on behavior, suggesting that an unconscious signal survives the masking by substitution (Chen & Treisman, 2009; Goodhew et al., 2011) . It is not clear, however, how unconscious information could be incorporated into the subjective confidence ratings in the present study. One option would be that the unconscious signal triggered a shift of attention to the location of the target (Woodman & Luck, 2003) , which might enable the observers to distinguish the targetpresent trials from target-absent trials in confidence ratings. Because the four dots would anyway shift attention to the target location irrespective of the presence or absence of the target, it remains unclear how the target-induced shift of attention could be subjectively discriminated from the shift triggered by the four dots alone.
An alternative account for the attentional blindness during OSM would suppose that feedforward activity is sufficient for visual awareness of target presence. Backward masking at a short SOA disrupts the signal at a feedforward stage with the consequence that there is no signal to reach visual awareness. OSM leaves the feedforward signal intact and does not block a target representation's presence in awareness: it substitutes the conscious representation of the target in awareness with that of the mask during reentrant processing. At a phenomenological level, the area surrounded by the four dots indeed looks empty for most of the time during delayed mask offset (because it is empty) and the observers base their target-absent decisions on this impression, not on the fleeting representation of the target which they fail to encode in visual short-term memory. A recent electrophysiological study (Prime et al., 2011 ) is in line with this view in suggesting that OSM influences performance at a relatively late stage of encoding the target in visual short-term memory. This view is also consistent with the finding that the observers used a conservative decision criterion during a delayed mask offset in the OSM condition. In other words, observers tended to report that no target was presented when they were uncertain about its presence. The lower confidence in miss trials than in correct rejection trials reveals that the observers were at some elementary level subjectively aware of the target even when absence of the target was reported in the binary forced-choice present-absent decisions.
Is it necessary to make the assumption of reentry for explaining the object substitution masking results? The critics of the reentrant theory of Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2000) have suggested that feedforward models of backward masking can account for object substitution masking results, without the assumption of reentry. Francis and Hermens (2002) performed computer simulations which suggested that feedforward theories can account for the data of Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2000) . However, Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2002) responded to this criticism by pointing out that the modeling of attention in terms of mask intensity was not plausible and that some of the feedforward models in fact included reentrant components. In addition, only a subset of the results of Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2002) was included in the simulations, ignoring important aspects of the data. Later simulations (Di Lollo et al., 2004; Francis & Cho, 2007) have found best fit to the results with models that incorporate reentrant processes. Even if we accept the importance of reentrant processing in visual processes, we are left with the problem of how good procedure the OSM is for discriminating between feedforward and reentrant processes. At neural level, extrastriate areas receive the feedforward signals from V1 within few milliseconds and start immediately to send reentrant signals back to V1 (Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) . It is not clear to what extent OSM is able to interfere with such early ''local recurrent processing'' or whether it interferes primarily with the later large-scale recurrent interactions involving parietal and frontal networks.
In sum, signal detection analysis of the forced-choice results showed that that OSM decreased sensitivity to the presence of the target. However, signal detection analysis of subjective confidence in the OSM trials in which no target was reported (misses, correct rejections) showed that the participants were able to subjectively discriminate between target-present and target-absent trials. It is plausible to assume that the object representation reached phenomenal awareness in OSM condition, but it was substituted rapidly during reentry by that of the mask. This interpretation is consistent with the concepts of vision-at-glance in RHT (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002) and gist in scene perception (Li et al., 2002) . Both concepts involve the idea that elementary conscious perception can be reached in purely feedforward manner. In this view, reentry serves as a modulatory mechanism (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2007) which shapes the clarity and vividness of conscious perception and makes it accessible for conscious report.
